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Is The Doha Development Round Succeeding? 
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The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) entered into force on 
February  22, 2017. It has re-oriented thinking on special and differential 
treatment at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Developing and 
least-developed countries can make their obligations conditional on the 
receipt of effective technical assistance that creates the necessary relevant 
capacity. They can also choose the implementation periods for provisions of 
the TFA in accordance with their own needs. These innovative approaches 
may be suitable for adoption in other agreements. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. NEGOTIATION AND OBLIGATIONS 
III. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
IV. DEVELOPMENT, GATT AND THE WTO 




The Doha Development Round has been a disappointment. When it was initiated 
in 2001, there were expectations, or at least hopes, of remedying the perceived 
imbalance of the Uruguay Round in which developing countries accepted new 
obligations in services and intellectual property without gaining much in return. 
Members of the WTO almost reached an agreement on the modalities for a way 
forward in 2008, but failed. Negotiations seem permanently stalled. The recent rise 
of populist, inward-looking movements in several developed countries has 
contributed towards a general sense of malaise. 
 
 
* Professor Emerita, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada. I am 
grateful for research assistance provided by Radha Lamba, and funding support from the 
Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. Email: mirish[at]uwindsor.ca. 
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On the other hand, the TFA offers some grounds for optimism. The TFA was 
adopted and submitted to the Members for acceptance on November 27, 2014.1 It 
entered into force on February 22, 2017 after acceptance by 110 Members.2 Two 
years since then, in mid-February 2019, a total of 141 Members have been a party to 
the Agreement.3 There had been widespread dissatisfaction with the Uruguay 
Round’s approach to special and differential treatment, which merely extended the 
time limits for adjustment. The new approach in the TFA gives achoice to 
developing and least-developed countries, flips conditionality, and might work to 
the general mutual advantage of WTO Members, in accordance with the objectives 
of both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (GATT) and the WTO.4 
 
This comment, in the second part, summarizes the negotiating history and 
substantive obligations under the TFA. Then, the third part describes the innovative 
mechanisms for implementation and technical assistance, which provide special and 
differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries.The fourth part 
examines these mechanisms in the context of previous GATT and WTO 
approaches. The final part considers the suitability of the TFA as a model for other 
negotiations in the WTO, concluding on a somewhat positive note, along with its 
limitations. 
 
II. NEGOTIATION AND OBLIGATIONS 
 
Trade facilitation was one of the areas proposed for negotiation in 1996, at the time 
of the Singapore Ministerial Conference, which was the first Ministerial Conference 
after the formation of the WTO. On four proposed issues, there was no agreement 
to undertake negotiations. For the first two, which were investment and 
competition, working groups were set up to study their relationships with trade, but 
any negotiations were to take place only after an explicit consensus was reached to 
that effect at a later date.5 Another working group was set up to study national 
 
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade 
Facilitation, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) 
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; The Trade Facilitation Agreement was added to the 
Marrakesh Agreement by General Council Decision of November 27, 2014, WTO Doc. 
WT/L/940, Annex [hereinafter Trade Facilitation Agreement]. 
2Trade Facilitation, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
3Id.  
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 
I.L.M. 1153; Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble (“Being desirous of contributing 
to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements”). 
5 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 1996, ¶ 20, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996). 
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policies on the third issue, which was transparency in government procurement 
practices.6 On the fourth issue, trade facilitation, the Council for Trade in Goods 
was instructed to undertake exploratory work.7 The Secretariat was directed to 
provide assistance to developing and least-developed countrymembers to participate 
in the work on government procurement and trade facilitation.8 
 
The Doha Development Round was launched at the Ministerial Conference in 
2001.9 For all four Singapore issues, it was decided that negotiations could go 
forward if modalities were agreed upon, by explicit consensus, at the next Ministerial 
Conference.10 In 2003, the Cancun Ministerial Conference failed to reach a 
consensus declaration, in part due to disagreement over the Singapore issues.11 In 
the Framework Agreement of August 1, 2004, investment, competition and 
transparency in government procurement were all rejected as areas for 
negotiations.12 There was explicit consensus that negotiations would go ahead on 
trade facilitation, on the basis of modalities contained in Annex D of that 
document.13 According to that Annex, the negotiations would aim to improve 
aspects of certain GATT provisions, to enhance technical assistance and capacity 
building, and to support cooperation among customs authorities.14 It was explicitly 
recognized that special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed 
countries would not be limited solely to extensions of transition periods, and that 
any commitments made would depend on the countries’ capabilities.15 Technical 
assistance would be provided to developing and least-developed countries for 
conducting the negotiations.16 Assistance and capacity building were emphasized for 
the implementation of any commitment. If a Member lacked the necessary capacity, 
particularly for infrastructure, implementation would not be required.17 
 
6Id. ¶ 21.  
7Id. 
8Id. ¶ 22. 
9 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].   
10Id. ¶¶ 20, 23, 26, 27. 
11 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Statement of 14 September 2003, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(03)/20 (2003). The trade facilitation negotiations nearly ended at this point, due 
to lack of a mandate. Establishing a link between capacity and commitment was key to 
resolving the impasse; Nora Neufeld, The Long and Winding Road: How WTO Members Finally 
Reached a Trade Facilitation Agreement, 6, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2014-06. 
12 Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, ¶ 1(g), WT/L/579 (Aug. 1, 
2004). 
13Id. 
14Id. at Annex D, ¶ 1. 
15Id. at Annex D, ¶¶ 2, 3. 
16Id. at Annex D, ¶ 5. 
17Id. at Annex D, ¶ 6. 




The TFA, as finalized, reflects the mandate established in 2004. It clarifies and 
expands on the obligations under GATT Article V (freedom of transit), GATT 
Article VIII (fees and formalities connected with importation and exportation) and 
GATT Article X (publication and administration of trade regulations). The 
Agreement contains innovative provisions on technical assistance and capacity 
building that conform to the requirements of the mandate. Additionally, it also 
supports cooperation among border authorities.  
 
The Agreement addresses the specific topics identified for the negotiations during 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005.18 Article 1 requires prompt 
publication of requirements for import, export and transit of goods, using internet 
updates to the extent possible and with contact information for enquiry points. 
Article 2 provides that the private sector must have the opportunity to know and 
comment on any proposed amendments, to the extent practicable. Under Article 3, 
states must establish a system of advance rulings that will remain valid for a 
reasonable period of time after issuance. Article 4 sets out the procedures for appeal 
and review, including the giving of reasons for administrative decisions. Article 5 
deals with border inspections and the testing of food, beverages and feedstuffs. 
Article 6 contains rules for the imposition of fees and charges connected with 
importing and exporting, as well as penalties for breach of customs laws and 
regulations. Article 7 sets out the requirements for modern release and clearance of 
imports, covering pre-arrival submission of information, electronic payment if 
practicable, release on guaranty or surety, risk management, post-clearance audits, 
publication of release times, advantageous treatment of authorized economic 
operators, expedited shipments and perishable goods. Articles 8 and 9 deal with 
official cooperation at shared borders and movement of goods through the territory 
under customs control. Article 10 contains the obligations concerning border 
formalities, covering simplification of documentary requirements, acceptance of 
paper or electronic copies, use of international standards, single window systems for 
processing of information, ban on preshipment inspectionsfor tariff classification 
and customs valuation purposes,19 ban on new rules requiring the use of customs 
brokers, encouragement of the use of common procedures and uniform 
 
18 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, ¶ 33, Annex E, 
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005) (These were: publication and availability of 
information, time periods, consultation, advance rulings, appeal procedures, impartiality, 
fees, formalities, prohibition of consular requirements, border agency cooperation, release, 
tariff classification and transit of goods). 
19 A footnote to Article 10.5.2 clarifies that this does not preclude inspections for sanitary 
and phytosanitary purposes. As well, it should not prevent advance screening for security 
purposes. See  Maureen Irish, Trade, Border Security, and Development, in LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 81 (Yong-Shik Lee et al. 
eds., 2011).  
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documentation, treatment of rejected goods, temporary admission of goods and 
inward or outward processing. Article 11 contains the rules on goods in transit. 
 
Cooperation among border authorities is governed by Article 12. Where there are 
reasonable grounds to doubt the accuracy of a declaration, Members can request the 
assistance of the authorities of another Member to verify information, including 
information in documents filed with the requested Member such as invoices, 
packing lists, certificates of origin and bills of lading. The request must be written 
and detailed, and must contain an explanation of its purpose. All information 
received is subject to confidentiality obligations set out in Article 12.5.1 and Article 
12.5.11. The requested Member should not be subject to an unmanageable 
administrative burden, given the practical limits on its resources. If there is no 
agreement on the prioritization among requests, the requested Member may use its 
own discretion regarding execution. If the requesting Member would itself have 
difficulty complying with a similar request, or if the requesting Member has not yet 
implemented Article 12, then the execution of a request is at the discretion of the 
requested Member. 
 
III. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
 
Section II of the TFA contains the innovative provisions on special and differential 
treatment for developing countries and least-developed countries. Implementation 
of provisions of the Agreement depends on the capacity of a developing or least-
developed Member. If the necessary capacity is lacking, implementation is not 
required.20 
 
Developing and least-developed country Members can decide to implement their 
TFA obligations in accordance with three categories, and the commitments under 
each category would be notified by the concerned country itself.21 Category A covers 
obligations that became binding on February 22, 2017, when the TFA came into 
force, or, in the case of a least-developed country Member, up to one year later,- on 
February 22, 2018.22 Category B is for commitments that become binding after a 
transition period. By February 22, 2018, developing countries had to give notice of 
these commitments and the corresponding transition periods.23 Least-developed 
countries are also required to give notice of category B commitments and 
corresponding transition periods on the same date, and will have to confirm those 
designations and dates generally within two years after their notification, by February 
 
20 Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, art.13.2. 
21Id. art. 14.2. 
22Id. art. 15.  
23Id. arts. 16.1(a)-(b) (A developing country could request an extension of the notification 
deadline). 
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22, 2020.24 Category B adopts the usual mechanism of transition periods, but each 
developing or least-developed Member chooses its own transition period.That 
change in itself is a major breakthrough. Further, the process of self-selection for 
commitments applies to all the obligations in Articles 1 to 12 of the TFA.25 This 
approach represents a significant reform of special and differential treatments. 
Individual countries choose their commitments on substantive matters, and not 
solely their tariff cutting commitments. Note that these commitments do not operate 
on the basis of direct reciprocity, except for border agency cooperation in Article 
12. Developing and least-developed Members are fully Members, whatever the level 
of their commitments are, and are entitled to the benefits of all TFA obligations of 
other Members. 
 
Category C is even more innovative. It covers the commitments that become 
binding after a transition period, if the developing or least developed country has 
acquired capacity to fulfil them as a result of assistance and support for capacity 
building. By February 22, 2017, developing countries had to give notice of their 
Category C commitments, corresponding indicative dates for implementation and 
the assistance and support required.26 For least-developed countries, the date for 
notification of Category C commitments was one year later, on February 22, 2018, 
and the indication of assistance and support required was due one year after that, on 
February 22, 2019.27 Notifications are made to the Committee on Trade Facilitation 
(the Committee) established pursuant to Article 23.1 of the TFA, which is open to 
participation by all Members. The Committee can set up subsidiary bodies to handle 
its responsibilities for the administration of the Agreement,28 including the Category 
C mechanism. 
 
Donor Members assisting developing and least-developed country Members for 
capacity building report annually to the Committee on the status and amount of the 
assistance and support provided, the procedures for disbursement, the beneficiary 
Member or region, and the responsible agency within the donor governments.29 
Donor Members and beneficiary Members provide the Committee with contact 
points for information and coordination.30 The Committee may also receive 
information from relevant international and regional organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF),  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
 
24Id. arts. 16.2(a)-(b) (A least-developed country may request an extension for the notification 
of its definitive dates for implementation). 
25Id. art. 13.1. 
26Id. art. 16(1)(c). 
27Id. art. 16(2)(c),(d). 
28Id. art. 23.1.3. 
29Id. art. 22.1. 
30Id. arts. 22.2, 22.3. 
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Development (UNCTAD), the World Customs Organisation (WCO), United 
Nations Regional Commission (UNRC), the World Bank or its subsidiary bodies, 
regional development banks, and other agencies of cooperation.31 Donor Member 
countries provide the assistance and support to developing and least-developed 
countries on mutually agreed terms, either bilaterally or through appropriate 
international organizations.32 The Committee holds at least one dedicated session 
per year to review the provision of assistance for capacity building, including the 
situation of any developing or least-developed country Members not receiving 
adequate assistance and support.33 
 
On February 22, 2018, one year after entry into force of the TFA, developing 
country Members and donor Members had to provide the Committee with 
information on arrangements made for the assistance and support to enable the 
developing country to implement its Category C obligations.34 Within eighteen 
months of the provision of this information, on August 22, 2019, a progress report 
is due and the developing country shall list its definitive dates for implementation.35 
Least-developed country Members and relevant donor countries have until February 
22, 2021, that is, four years after the entry into force, to give the Committee the 
information on arrangements made for assistance and support.36 Further, on August 
22, 2022, that is, eighteen months after the provision of this information, a progress 
report is due and the least-developed country shall give notice of its definitive dates 
for implementation.37 
 
The TFA has rigorous deadlines for setting the time for implementation of Category 
B and Category C commitments, but does not restrict the length of transition time 
that a country can choose,38 with one exception. The Secretariat is to give developing 
and least-developed countries a three-month reminder of the duty to set definitive 
dates for implementation of Category B and Category C obligations. If no such dates 
are set, implementation is to take place within one year from the time of setting of 
the definitive dates.39 Developing and least-developed countries having difficulty 
submitting definitive dates due to lack of donor support need to report this to the 
 
31Id. art. 22.5. 
32Id. art. 21.1. 
33Id. art. 21.4. 
34Id. art. 16.1(d). 
35Id. art. 16.1 (e).  
36Id. art. 16.2(d).  
37Id. art. 16.2(e). 
38 Bernard Hoekman, The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone, 
Mistake or Mirage, 15(Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance 
Programme-132, Working Paper  RSCAS 2014/102, 2014), 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33031/RSCAS_2014_102.pdf?sequence=1.  
39 Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16.4. 
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Committee as soon as possible, as the Committee has power to extend the deadline 
for notification.40 
 
A developing or a least-developed country that considers it will have difficulty in 
implementing an obligation in time should give an advanced warning to the 
Committee. The warning shall include a new date for implementation and an 
explanation of the reasons for the delay.41 Developing countries are entitled to an 
additional time of eighteen months for implementation,42 while least-developed 
countries are entitled to an additional time of three years for implementation.43 
Countries can request a longer first extension and the Committee shall give a 
sympathetic consideration to such a request.44 Furthermore, countries have the 
power to shift their commitments between Category B and Category C and can 
request an examination by the Committee of a request for extra time.45 
 
A developing or least-developed country can notify the Committee that it is unable 
to meet a Category C obligation, as implementation is not required if the country 
lacks the required capacity, according to Article 13.2.46 An Expert Group will then 
be established to review the matter and make a recommendation to the Committee.47 
In the case of a least-developed country, the Committee shall, as appropriate, 
facilitate the acquisition of capacity.48 A developing country Member is immune 
from proceedings on the issue under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
until the first meeting of the Committee, after it has received the recommendation 
of the Expert Group.49 A least-developed country Member is immune from the DSU 
for twenty four months after the first Committee meeting following the Expert 
Group’s recommendation or until the Committee makes a decision, whichever is 
earlier.50 The Committee makes decisions after considering the recommendations 
from the Expert Group, but it does not have the dispute-resolution powers of the 
DSU.  
 
These provisions are aimed at implementation rather than a finding of breach of an 
obligation under the DSU. For Category A commitments, developing countries were 
 
40Id. art. 16.3. 
41Id. art. 17.1. 
42Id. art. 17.2. 
43Id.  art. 17.2. 
44Id. arts. 17.3, 17.4. 
45Id. art. 19. 
46Id. art. 18.1. 
47Id. art. 18.2. 
48Id. art. 18.4. 
49Id. art. 18.5. 
50Id. art. 18.5. 
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immune from DSU proceedings for two years after entry into force.51 For Category 
A commitments, least-developed countries are immune from the DSU for six years 
after entry into force.52 For Categories B and C, least developed countries are 
immune from the DSU for a full eight years after implementation of the 
commitment.53 Even if the grace period has expired, Members are required to 
exercise due restraint concerning complaints against least-developed country 
Members.54 Moreover, Article 13.2 cannot be amended by the Expert Group, the 
Committee or the Panel and Appellate Body in DSU proceedings. Article 13.2 
emphasizes the fundamental understanding from the modalities in 2004 that if a 
developing or least-developed country Member continues to lack capacity, then 
implementation is not required. 
 
IV. DEVELOPMENT, GATT AND THE WTO 
 
The detailed provisions on special and differential treatment were not elaborated in 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration in 2005. The innovative mechanisms for 
developing and least-developed country Members in the TFA are the result of 
lengthy and careful negotiations since that time.  
 
There are two main features that are unique in these provisions.The first is the opt-
in, which allows developing and least-developed Members to establish their own 
deadlines for implementation of obligations. Some deadlines must be notified at the 
time of entry into force of the Agreement. Others are notified after the entry into 
force. Each developing or least-developed country Member has the opportunity to 
match its obligations to its economic situation, within the terms of the TFA. The 
second unique feature is the link between capacity and commitment. Developing 
and least-developed country members can choose to make implementation 
contingent on receiving technical assistance that is effective and that builds the 
required relevant capacity. Donor Member countries have reporting obligations for 
the assistance they provide. Both the opt-in and the capacity/commitment link 
switch control to developing and least-developed countries and give them flexibility 
to respond to the challenges that each one faces. The overall approach is similar to 
the positive list technique in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. In that 
agreement, developing countries determine their own level of commitment and can 
attach conditions promoting their participation in world trade.55 In the TFA, 
 
51Id. art. 20.1. 
52Id. art. 20.2. 
53Id. art. 20.3. 
54Id. art. 20.4. 
55 General Agreement on Trade in Services, arts. IV, XIX.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 
I.L.M. 1167; See MANUELA TORTORA, UNITED Nations Conference on Trade and 
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obligations arise after a transition period of the Member’s choice and in accordance 
with its own capacity. Moreover, obligations can be contingent onthe receipt of 
technical assistance that has successfully created the needed capacity for 
implementation. Is the TFA a new ray of hope for development at the WTO? 
 
There is considerable disappointment over the lack of progress in the Doha Round, 
which was meant to correct the imbalances resulting from the Uruguay Round.56 
Frank Garcia argues that the Uruguay Round moved the WTO from the 
development model of the 1979 Enabling Clause,57 to a new paradigm of time-
limited adjustment to a free market level playing field. He maintains that while open 
trade may be necessary, it is not sufficient for successful economic development.58 
A return to a development model would entail a number of features, including 
transition periods linked to objective economic and social criteria, so that extensions 
would be available until capacity is established.59 
 
The TFA marks a return to the development model through linkages between 
capacity and commitment, with technical assistance and capacity assessment geared 
towards specific provisions in the Agreement. The 1979 Enabling Clause expresses 
the same link. The graduation principle in Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause 
contains the expectation that developing countries will make greater trade 
concessions and contributions once their economies improve.60 The non-reciprocity 
principle in Paragraph 5 of the Clause emphasizes that developing countries are not 
expected to make concessions that are inconsistent with their needs.61 Moreover, 
Paragraph 5 also provides that developed countries “shall not seek” such 
concessions that are beyond a developing country’s capacity.62 The idea of a link 
between capacity and commitment is a longstanding part of GATT and WTO 
thinking on special and differential treatment. The TFA applies it to particular 
obligations and relies on technical assistance to produce the needed capacity. 
Furthermore, the TFA involves donor countries in related ongoing reporting 
obligations. 
 
Development, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN 
THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE SKELETON IN THE CLOSET 4 ( 2003).  
56Sunjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’’L. L. J. 
573, 575 (2010).  
57 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT Doc. L/4903, BISD 26S/203 
[hereinafter Enabling Clause].  
58 Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27(1) B.C. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 
291, 299-300 (2004). 
59Id. at 307. 
60 Enabling Clause, supra note 57, ¶ 7. 
61Id. ¶ 5. 
62Id. 




The transition periods in the TFA aim for a level playing field of obligations, with a 
few that are ‘best efforts’ undertakings, especially for the use of electronic 
communication technology. The substantive commitments are not distinct to 
developing and least-developed Members, although the timing is distinct for the 
circumstances of each developing or least-developed country. It will be important 
to emphasize that if capacity is lacking, “implementation of the provision(s) 
concerned will not be required until implementation capacity has been acquired”, in 
the terms of Article 13.2 of the Agreement. This proviso was fundamental to the 
success of the negotiations. In addition, acquisition of capacity involves the activity 
of the donor countries, as well as the recipient countries.  
 
There are ways in which the TFA experiment might fail. First, the operation of the 
Agreement depends on voluntary participation of both sides, the developed 
countries as well as the developing and least developed countries. Developed 
country Members accepted that technical assistance ‘should’ be provided,63 and that 
they would ‘facilitate’ such support for capacity-building.64 The support can be 
provided bilaterally or through various international organizations, such as the IMF, 
the OECD, UNCTAD, the WCO, the UNRC, the World Bank or their subsidiary 
bodies, regional development banks, and other agencies of cooperation.65 There is a 
long history of voluntary tariff preferences being reduced in effectiveness as they 
came to reflect donor country interests rather than those of the recipient countries 
alone.66 Perhaps the supervision by the Committee,67 and the various institutions of 
the global public sector will guard against the risk of donor conditionality. A second 
potential concern is that technical assistance funding requires transparency and 
accountability to meet the purpose of capacity-building.68 The reporting obligations 
in the TFA should assist with supervision, although it is less clear whether assistance 
can be coordinated when several agencies with individual mandates are involved,69 
along with technical assistance from the private sector.70 The focus on specific 
 
63 Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 13.2, 21.2.  
64Id. art. 21.1. 
65Id. arts. 21.1, 22.5. 
66 Thomas R. Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries: 
International Innovation and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT’L. L. 513 (1978); Thomas P. 
Cutler, The United States Generalized System of Preferences: The Problem of Substantial Transformation, 
5(3) N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 393 (1980); D. Robert Webster & Christopher P. Bussert, 
The Revised Generalized System of Preferences: ‘Instant Replay’ or a Real Change?, 6(4) NW. J. INT’L. 
L. & BUS. 1035 (1984-85); See Hoekman, supra note 38, at 16. 
67 Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 23.1.  
68 Marjorie Florestal, Technical Assistance Post-Doha: Is There Any Hope of Integrating Developing 
Countries into the Global Trading System?, 24(1) ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 121 (2007). 
69See Hoekman, supra note 38, at 25. 
70 Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 21.3(c).  
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technical assistance to meet particular provisions of the TFA should make 
supervision somewhat easier than it is for more general economic development 
programmes, but management may be challenging. 
 
At the meeting of the Committee on Trade Facilitation in mid-February 2019, the 
WTO Secretariat reported that the TFA had been ratified by 86% of WTO 
Members. The overall rate of commitments implementation was 61.3%, seeing a 
100% implementation by the developed countries, 60.3% by the developing 
countries and 22.8% by the least developed countries.71 The provisions attracting 
the highest rates of implementation commitments are: Article 9 movement of goods, 
Article 10.5 pre-shipment inspection, Article 10.6 use of customs brokers, Article 
5.2 detention and Article 10.9 temporary admission of goods.72 These provisions 
relate to traditional procedures for movement of goods and customs clearances. It 
can be expected that many WTO Members are already in compliance or might find 
compliance relatively easy. The provisions attracting the lowest rates of 
implementation commitments are: Article 8 border agency cooperation, Article 7.6 
average release times, Article 3 advance rulings, Article 5.3 test procedures, Article 
7.7 authorized operators and Article 10.4 single window.73 These last provisions are 
of more recent vintage in customs administration, linked to the use of modern 
information technology or recent innovations in practice such as the use of trusted 
trader programmes. For these provisions, compliance could be challenging for 
developing and least-developed country Members. Technical assistance might help 
with matters such as legal reform or the training of personnel. If a commitment 
involves new computer hardware or software, there could be a question of ongoing 
funding for upgrades and replacement equipment. A country would need to be 
assured of its long-term capacity before deciding to implement such measures. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The TFA has re-oriented the discussion in the WTO around special and differential 
treatment for developing and least-developed countries. There are approaches to 
consider other than a general time-limit for adjustment to a harmonized obligation. 
The Agreement uses two new features that provide more flexibility. First, developing 
and least-developed country Members can opt-in to the time for implementation of 
individual provisions of the Agreement. Second, the Agreement links capacity and 
 
71Members discuss progress and assistance on Trade Facilitation Agreement’s 2nd year, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/fac_14feb19_e.htm. 
72Trade Facilitation Agreement Database, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.tfadatabase.org/implementation/progress-by-measure (last visited May 17, 
2019). 
73Id. 
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commitment. Developing and least-developed countries can choose to make specific 
obligations conditional on acquiring capacity through technical assistance from 
other Member countries. There is no obligation if there is no capacity. These features 
may or may not be suitablein other areas of WTO law. 
 
The opt-in feature that allows developing and least-developed countries to choose 
the implementation date for specific provisionsmay work best incertain 
contexts.Trade facilitation is intended to benefit traders in general. Implementation 
will be easier for some countries than for others and small businesses will face greater 
challenges than larger firms with more staff. The intent, however, is that the benefit 
is general and available across a range of commercial sectors. A negotiation on trade 
facilitation does not depend on the win/loss assumptions of mercantilist bargaining, 
in which the interests of exporters of one product from one country are balanced 
against the interests of exporters of another product from another country.If 
negotiators need to be able to predict defined balances and trade-offs, they would 
face difficulties if the level of implementation at the time of signing is not known. 
Of course, there will always be some unpredictability over how many countries will 
agree to a given deal. Differing obligations and delayed implementation create an 
additional level of uncertainty. The opt-in feature may work best in areas such as 
rules’ negotiations, where there can be general benefits, and negotiations are not only 
about win/loss results.74 
 
The link between capacity and commitment is a long-established part of GATT and 
WTO thinking. The unique aspects in the TFA are the recognition of choice by 
developing and least-developed countries, the link to donor-provided effective 
technical assistance and the Expert Group that reviews a Member’s self-assessment 
of capacity before a dispute goes to the DSU. The United Nations climate change 
negotiations acknowledge a similar general link between the receipt of fundingand 
the ability ofdeveloping countries to make commitments. The Paris Agreement 
recognizes that support for developing countries will enhance their capability to 
combat climate change and its effects.75 In consequence, developed countries now 
agree to provide financial resources to developing countries, at least in principle.76 
The idea that developed countries must pay for certain reforms by developing 
countries  may be increasingly accepted. The TFA is an example of this principle in 
a specific context. The idea of payment for reform is only suitable if there is some 
 
74 Ben Czapnik, The Unique Features of the Trade Facilitation Agreement: A Revolutionary New 
Approach to Multilateral Negotiations or the Exception Which Proves the Rule?, 18(4) J. INT’L. ECON. 
L. 773 (2015). 
75 Paris Agreement (Dec. 13, 2015),art. 4(5), in UNFCCC, COP Report No. 21, Addendum, 
at 21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add, 1 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
76Id. at arts. 9(1), 10(6). (Article 11(4) requires all Parties involved in capacity-building to 
report regularly on progress).  
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expectation of benefit for all. The world’s climate is obviously a shared resource and 
global warming is a shared concern. In the context of the TFA, border 
administration that is more efficient, more reliable and more transparent is intended 
to benefit traders in general. This is not an area for the win/loss assumptions of 
mercantilist bargaining. Moreover, the emphasis on technical assistance and capacity 
building in the negotiations may have promoted the identification of practicommon 
interests. Certain aspects of the TFA, such as choice by developing countries, 
obligations being conditioned on the receipt of effective technical assistance, and 
expert capacity assessment prior to full dispute settlement, will not be suitable for 
all topics in WTO negotiations. Like the opt-in feature, they may have some use in 
areas where specific obligations and capacities can be linked, and where there is some 
expectation of overall general benefit. 
 
Flexibility for developing and least-developed countries is a hallmark of the TFA. 
The Agreement marks the end of the Single Undertaking approach from the 
Uruguay Round, which required all WTO Members to acceptan entire package of 
agreements. The TFA entered into effect on acceptance by two-thirds of the 
Members,and is binding only on those who have accepted it.77 As Meredith Kolsky 
Lewis points out, the views of developed and developing countries have been at 
odds since the founding of the WTO and divergences are strong as the Doha 
Development Round appears to be faltering.78 The opt-in feature and the 
capacity/commitment link in the TFA demonstrate that flexibility is possible in at 
least some areas. The ray of hope is not a strong one, but perhaps the Doha 
Development Round can produce some successes that respond to the needs of 
developing and least-developed country Members. Perhaps the TFA will be an 
example of the ‘balanced rules and well-targeted, sustainably financed technical 
assistance and capacity-building programmes’ that were envisaged at Doha.79 
 
77Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 1, art. X (3). 
78Meredith K. Lewis, The Embedded Liberalism Compromise in the Making of the GATT and Uruguay 
Round Agreements, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE 
EMBEDDED LIBERALISM COMPROMISE REVISITED 12, 25-27 (Gillian Moon & Lisa Toohey 
eds., 2018).  
79 Doha Declaration, supra note 9, ¶ 2.   
